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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story about a reasonably obscure provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), and about the story behind
the story. Sadly, it is a tale that demonstrates one of the pitfalls of
undertaking comprehensive omnibus legislation.
The notion of a comprehensive rewrite of the Communications Act of
1934 had-and still has-understandable appeal. Technology has advanced
ever more quickly, and by the early 1990's it clearly had rendered many
aspects of the Communications Act incomplete, archaic, and/or overbear-
ing.
However, it bears notice that the broad definitional scope of the Act-
which created an independent Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and empowered the FCC to regulate all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio-worked very well and proved capable of
adapting remarkably to changed circumstances. The FCC was able to deal
with radar, lasers, microwave ovens, television, communications satellites,
cable television, and countless other developments long before Congress
adopted amendments specifically addressing them.
However, there are costs as well as benefits from undertaking a top to
bottom rewrite of the Communications Act. In particular such legislation
inevitably becomes a vehicle for insertion of seemingly small, seemingly
benign, provisions which can, in fact, effect significant changes in power
relationships.
The 1996 Act was generally regarded as a bill which created local
telephone competition and which promoted competition between and
among the cable and telephone industries. Contemporary press reports
devoted scant attention to the broadcast ownership and digital television
provisions in the statute. Few members of Congress other than members of
the originating committees were likely aware of those aspects of the bill.
When legislation is complicated and far reaching, it is inevitably the
case that effective lobbyists can use it as a vehicle for amendments which
are likely to go unnoticed and without discussion. Other affected parties,
especially the general public, are usually left in the dark.
Section 202(h) of the 1996 Act is one such amendment.1 As originally
enacted, it directed the FCC to subject its broadcast ownership rules to
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56,
111-12 (1996). Another such provision is 47 U.S.C. § 204(a)(3) (2002). See also ACS of
Anchorage v. FCC, 290 F.3d 403, 410-14 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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what amounted to non-stop scrutiny.2 On its face, it simply calls on the
FCC to conduct periodic reviews of its broadcast ownership rules. Section
202(h) reads as follows:
Further Commission Review: The Commission shall review its rules
adopted pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules
biennially as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of
the Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether any of
such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of
competition. The Commission shall repeal or m~dify any regulation it
determines to be no longer in the public interest.
There is no legislative history explaining its origin or what Congress
may have intended in adopting it. Nor could there have been any
meaningful discussion of what its unidentified sponsors may have sought,
or what the conference committee which adopted it might have thought, as
Section 202(h) was not subject to any public discussion prior to its
adoption. Indeed, for several years after enactment of the 1996 Act, no one
would publicly claim credit for having anything to do with its drafting and
enactment.
Seven years after Section 202(h) became law, an intrepid reporter,
named Alicia Mundy, ultimately discovered the story of Section 202(h)'s
birth. She found that Section 202(h) was "carefully crafted language"
developed in secret by 4two in-house lobbyists then employed by Rupert
Murdoch's News Corp.
Mundy reported that the two lobbyists, Peggy Binzel and Preston
Padden, recognized that Congress was ultimately unlikely to make
significant changes to the national ownership cap, which limited how many
TV stations one company could own. Thus, as Ms. Mundy states:
That's when Binzel and Padden and others devised a plan to keep the
cap in play after the bill, in whatever form, passed .... If the networks
and deregulators in the Senate, such as [Senator John] McCain,
couldn't get legislation to remove the cap, they could punt it to the
FCC. It meant that the FCC would have to eliminate or justify the cap,
and this presented companies with an opportunity to use the FCC's
innate lethargy... against itself ....
Several veteran Republicans and Democrats who signed on to that
original bill are now busy denouncing its consequences, acting as
2. The provision has been amended to provide for quadrennial rather than biennial
review. Because of the length of time it took to conduct these proceedings, the original
requirement for biennial review meant that, in practice, there was nonstop scrutiny.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56,
111-12 (1996).
4. See Alicia Mundy, Put the Blame on Peggy, Boys, CABLE WORLD, June 30, 2003,
http://www.cableworld.com/cgi/cw/show-mag.cgi?pub=cw&mon=063003&file=put-blame
_peggy.inc.
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though provision 202h had been dropped on their doorstep by some
wayward stork. Although these senators would like to distance
themselves from 202h, it is actually their very own love child.
5
For a while, at least, it appeared that Section 202(h) would be a potent
weapon. Although the Clinton-era FCC initially construed Section 202(h)
as little more than a reporting requirement, News Corp., which reportedly
had retained litigation counsel even before the FCC completed its first
biennial review, mounted a successful judicial challenge, obtaining a
ruling that temporarily gave a broad reading to Section 202(h).
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 202(h)
The FCC's first biennial review proceeding was initiated in a timely
fashion in1998, but was not completed until June 20, 2000, shortly before
the Commission was required to initiate its next review (i.e., 2000). As
soon as the FCC completed the 1998 biennial review, News Corp. and
other broadcasters immediately challenged the action in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
In Fox I, the petitioners challenged the FCC's determination that the
retention of the national television ownership rule and the cable broadcast
cross-ownership rule were necessary in the public interest, within the
meaning of Section 202(h).8 In siding with the broadcasters, the Court
found that the FCC's decision to retain both rules under the necessary
public interest standard was arbitrary and capricious.9 The Court made
clear that it was not construing what the term necessary meant; that is, the
Court was not deciding if it imposed a higher standard of "indispensable"
or a lower standard of "useful" as the FCC had failed to justify retention of
the rules under both standards. 10 The Court remanded the national
television ownership rule and vacated the cable broadcast cross-ownership
rules. Significantly, in determining the appropriate remedy, the Court
construed Section 202(h) to "carr[y] with it a presumption in favor of
repealing or modifying the ownership rules."" Unbeknownst to the Court,
the FCC would eventually attempt to use this language to prescribe an
5. Id.
6. Binzel had already lined up an appellate lawyer for the inevitable day of
reckoning-Ed Warren of Kirkland and Ellis. Id.
7. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002),
modified on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
8. Id. at 1040.
9. Id. at 1045, 1049.
10. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I1), 293 F.3d 537, 539-40 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
11. Fox , 280 F.3d at 1048.
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extreme deregulatory scheme.
A few months after Fox I, but before Fox II, a different panel of the
D.C. Circuit relied upon the Fox I "presumption" in finding that the FCC's
decision to restrict local television ownership had also been arbitrary and
capricious and remanded the rule back to the FCC. 12 Again, as in Fox I, the
Sinclair Court did not construe the definition of "necessary."
Following its obligation under Section 202(h), the FCC initiated yet
another biennial review in 2002. This time it did so by issuing a single
notice of proposed rule making ("NPRM"). Rather than deal with each
provision separately, the NPRM proposed to address all of the FCC's
broadcast ownership rules: (1) national TV ownership; (2) local duopoly
(on remand from Fox and Sinclair decisions); (3) local radio ownership;
and, (4) broadcast cross-ownership. Relying on Fox and Sinclair, the FCC
conducted its review with the notion that "Section 202(h) carries with it a
presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules."
13
Thus, the FCC majority ultimately concluded the review by determining
that existing ownership restrictions were no longer necessary to achieve the
Communication Act's goals of diversity, localism, and competition.
Consequently, the FCC's June 2003 Biennial Review decision either
eliminated or greatly relaxed most of the existing ownership rules. For
example, the national TV audience cap was increased from 35% to 45%.14
Both Congress and public interest groups immediately reacted.
Congress began the process of enacting a resolution of disapproval
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9655, but this became unnecessary once the Third
Circuit issued a stay in September 2003.15 Later, Congress partially
overruled the Commission by amending the national ownership cap in
Section 202(c) from 35% to 39%, thereby showing its disapproval of the
FCC's attempt to increase the cap to 45%. 6 Congress provided additional
relief in the form of directing that subsequent reviews would be conducted
quadrennially rather than biennially. 17
The new rules were then successfully challenged by public interest
groups. 18 In Prometheus, the Third Circuit took a careful and detailed
12. Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
13. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, para. 11 (2003) (citing Fox I, 280 F.3d at 1048, and
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 159).
14. Id. para. 501.
15. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 382 (3rd Cir. 2004).
16. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat.
3, 99 (2004).
17. Id. at § 629(3).
18. See Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 395 (allowing many public interest groups to
participate in the suit).
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approach in construing the FCC's duty under Section 202(h). Of greatest
relevance to this discussion, the court expressly rejected the FCC
majority's application of a "presumption in favor of deregulation."' 9 For
the FCC to determine whether a rule was indeed necessary in the public
interest, the Prometheus court, unlike the Fox and Sinclair courts, decided
the appropriate standard for which the FCC was to conduct its review. The
Prometheus court adopted the reasoning of a D.C. Circuit opinion issued
after the FCC had issued its Biennial Review decision.
20
The Prometheus court concluded that the meaning of "necessary" was
to be "convenient," "useful," or "helpful" and not "essential" or
"indispensable." '2 1 Using this standard, while the court affirmed much of
the FCC's Order, the court also remanded some of the provisions because
the FCC had "fall[en] short of its obligation to justify its decisions to retain,
repeal, or modify its media ownership regulations with reasoned
analysis."
' 22
In adopting the less stringent standard, the court noted that neither
Fox nor Sinclair held that the term "necessary" resulted in a presumption in23
favor of modifying or repealing existing regulations. Rather, the Fox and
Sinclair courts finding of a presumption was limited to the context in which
it was made.24 That is, since the Fox and Sinclair Courts had already
determined the challenged rules were arbitrary and capricious, the pre-
sumption was only applicable to the appropriate remedy: whether to vacate
or remand the rule.
25
Despite the attempt to deregulate through the back door, it would
seem that the courts have resolved ambiguities relating to the interpretation
of Section 202(h) in favor of making it a less intrusive provision.
III. CONCLUSION
The history of Section 202(h) is ultimately one of a partially
successful legislative ambush. Although, in the end, the statute has been
construed as not creating a new standard of review, and Congress has cut
the frequency of review by half, Section 202(h) nonetheless remains as a
major resource drain for the FCC and offers broadcasters an assured
opportunity to seek greater ownership deregulation on a regular schedule.
19. Id. at 423.
20. Id. at 393 (citing Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
21. Id. at 394.
22. Id. at 435.
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One obvious lesson is that members of Congress-even those not on
the originating committees-have a serious obligation to review what
comes out of conference and to question unexplained provisions. Reducing
both the expectations for, and size of, legislative packages would make it
more likely that rank and file members could actually review what comes
out of conference. However, even where they do so, it remains the case that
unless Congress makes wholesale changes in its traditional rules, those
with special access to the legislative process will always be able to add
measures such as Section 202(h) to large, or major bills. Such changes are
unlikely to happen soon, if ever. While more modest changes affording
greater transparency would at least assure greater public notice, they would
not likely alter the process significantly. Campaign finance reform, which
minimized the role of money in the legislative process, probably would
also help by reducing incentives to give special access to contributors.
However, that too would probably not end the tradition of inserting
seemingly small amendments into big bills.
Responsible legislators thus face a dilemma. Targeted legislation may
be less susceptible to manipulation of the kind represented by Section
202(h). However, such small scale measures do not facilitate the big picture
vision that can only come with more comprehensive legislation. Viewed in
that light, Section 202(h) and similar provisions may impose unavoidable
costs in any major legislative rewrite of the Communications Act.
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